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One function of CUL in the joint environment is transportation. CUL related transportation includes sealift, airlift, port operation, land transportation, movement control, logistics over-theshore, and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. 2 The Commander, Army
Forces (COMARFOR) is responsible for numerous logistics functions including common-user land transportation. 3 Common-user land transportation (CULT) proved to be a critical commodity during Operation Iraqi Freedom's largest rotation of forces since World War II.
The 1 st Infantry Division leadership observed that transportation managers at the Theater and Corps could not efficiently or effectively employ or redeploy forces during the Winter and
Spring of 2004 transition nor could they maximize transportation assets due to lack of visibility and positive control of critical Theater ground transportation assets. Doctrine for managing these assets must be improved to increase transportation management efficiency and effectiveness through better management processes and situational awareness (SA). Two areas that could be improved are the inclusion of specific contract requirements within all civilian augmentation transportation contracts and consolidate all transportation units under one functional command.
The inclusion of contract negotiations for the management and visibility of commercial transportation is critical to the future of distribution operations in the future. Because current multinational operations to fight the counterinsurgency and terrorist warfare occur in a layered, non-linear, non-contiguous battle space, making improvements in the management of ground transportation assets is even more critical than in standard conventionally linear and contiguous warfare. This study will discuss problems experienced by the theater in the transition phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom I and Operation Iraqi Freedom II. It will recommend doctrinal and procedural changes needed for more effective theater transportation management in this new, but likely to be persistent, military environment.
Consolidating all transportation units not already organized as a part of a Unit of Action will reduce the amount of coordination that has been required in the past. Lack of coordination between Theater and Corps level movement control authorities resulted in missed opportunities to maximize onward movement of supplies, equipment and units as well as the retrograde of supplies and equipment.
Improving these two areas of doctrine within the combatant commander's area of responsibility will make for a more efficient and effective transportation process within the Joint battlefield of the future. The result will be an improvement of integrated commercial transportation assets within a single command and control (C2) Headquarters responsible for the distribution management throughout the entire theater.
BACKGROUND
In preparation for the deployment of the 1 st Infantry Division, as the G4, I attended several
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) directed transportation planning conferences and rehearsals to ensure that I understood what was expected of the 1 st Infantry
Division as it moved through the ports of Kuwait to northern staging bases, then conducted its approach march across the berm between Kuwait and Iraq into our sector in the north central sector of Iraq. I also wanted to understand what I could expect from the support structure that was to enable this move north. It was important to ensure that both the units being employed and the units providing the capability to employ met agreed upon expectations.
During the planned deployment and subsequent employment of all the forces through Kuwait all involved realized it would be the largest exchange of forces since WW II. This force exchange would also occur through the extremely limited port infrastructure in Kuwait. The restriction of the limited available movement assets was also recognized by all planners and senior leadership involved in this historical endeavor.
Four months of deployment and employment preparation ensued. Plans were shared, visits and briefing were provided, and rehearsals were conducted between the Division and elements of CFLCC, in particular the 377 th Theater Support Command (TSC). The CFLCC and TSC staffs were very cooperative in the development and coordination of plans and sharing execution capabilities for planning. Issues began to arise once the deployment was in full swing as the Division began to clear the seaports. The ground transportation system was not consistent nor did it meet with the expectation of the Division, based on discussions during the prior months. The Division had developed its plan for employment of forces based on the expectations of onward movement derived from the earlier reconnaissance visits and confirmed during backbriefs. Planning factors for both military vehicle capabilities and commercial transportation capabilities were understood and used to develop a plan for a deliberate flow.
The Division structure for the reception, staging, and onward movement (RSO) of Task Force Danger was constructed to ensure key leaders, including commanders, were at key nodes of the RSO process. The Division Support Command (DISCOM) supported the deployment and prepared for early employment to ensure success of enabling follow-on combat forces in the Division sector. The Division Artillery headquarters was assigned the task of controlling the flow from both the air and sea ports of debarkation. To assist the Division Artillery staff with deployment coordination and provide technical expertise, the Division G4 staff was also dispersed throughout these nodes with key elements of the DISCOM.
The RSO command and control node was located in Camp Arifjan, collocated with CFLCC logistics staff support elements. The structure of this command post provided a single location for all logistics coordination. This structure provided seamless logistical support from unit through theater and strategic support agencies for both deployment and employment operations.
All major commands, whether deploying, employing, or redeploying, provided a liaison element to CFLCC to ensure that all unit information was available across all staff elements.
These elements were incorporated into this command post. Movement updates were provided to the CFLCC and TSC leadership twice daily to identify issues, track issues, and provide solutions to current and unforeseen challenges. These battle update assessments (BUA) were briefed in the CFLCC command center by all unit representatives and CFLCC and TSC staff elements. These updates targeted senior CFLCC and TSC leadership and they had the ability and authority to solve deployment, employment, and redeployment problems.
Within the CFLCC command post, the TSC was responsible for the management of Common-user land transportation. Part of the command's responsibility was to ensure sufficient Common-user land transportation assets were available to receive, stage, and onward move the units through Kuwait. The 143d Transportation Command executed the plan through the management of both military units within the transportation command and the control of the commercial vehicles made available through a civilian contract.
During the Division's reception and staging process, the Division discovered that the military and commercial transportation assets projected for use were not available as planned.
Significant shortfalls of available assets were experienced; measured shortfall, were 80-90% of the projected requirements. 4 The command post conducted daily coordination meetings to ensure that the employing unit and the transportation units executing the move identified the requirement and matched them with available assets. This was discussed in detail to ensure specific types of vehicles were available. A decision, based on known requirements, was made about whether commercial trucks or military trucks would be used. Missions were assigned based on the destination of movement and type of equipment that required movement. The type of equipment requiring movement was then divided between heavy lift and line haul. Heavy lift equipment required heavy equipment transporters (HETS) capable of moving equipment like self-propelled artillery, tanks, and large pieces of engineer equipment. Line haul assets were capable of hauling all other equipment not carried by the owning unit. Additionally, in the planning another factor had to be considered as some commercial assets were not allowed to move north of the Kuwait border because of contracting restrictions and could only be used to move from the sea port to the Staging Bases.
The daily coordination meetings identified requirements and capabilities by mission and location. Known Theater and Corps assets were reviewed based on expected movement plans and schedules. Based on these movements, assets were allocated to accommodate unit movement plans.
PROBLEM
During the employment and onward movement of the 1 st Infantry Division, its staff discovered that the process followed by the transportation command, within the TSC, did not provide accurate or timely visibility of the transportation assets that were available. The transportation allocation process and direct observation confirmed that many commercial and military transportation assets, both heavy equipment transporters and line haul equipment, were moving between Iraq and Kuwait in both directions without loads and some were just sitting for days waiting for loads. The movement control battalion required units to turn in transportation movement requests (TMRs) for movements, listing by bumper number and type of equipment that was to be moved. 5 However this quickly became overcome by events as the transportation assets that arrived each day varied from the plan and it became incumbent on the unit to load them the best they could, sometimes resulting in hauling containers on HETs. 6 During the daily transportation allocation meetings, the number of truck assets was programmed against anticipated assets that would be available. These projected truck assets always fell well short of actual available assets, routinely only 10-20% of the projected numbers.
Compounding the problem, the types of trucks available were different from the projected types.
As a result, the Division was forced to reallocate the actual number of trucks available and to plan for critically short HETs to move light equipment. This resulted in a disagreement of priorities and was inconsistent with the theater policy. Because the theater was critically short HET assets, these assets eventually became reserved to move only heavy or oversized equipment.
During the Division's onward movement to Tikrit, 5-8% of the Division's assigned equipment was non-mission capable. Without the capability to move this equipment with its own assigned equipment, the Division left the non-mission capable equipment behind in the staging area for onward movement at a later date. This decision was inconsistent with theater policy as the movement of non-mission capable equipment was the responsibility of the unit. One of the most important elements of transportation management is movement control.
Though the transportation system is composed of modal, terminal, and movement control operations, movement control is the most critical of these components. 14 Without the management and control of transportation assets, there is no means to ensure that the use of each asset is maximized in its hauling capacity, in both the delivery of supplies and the return of any potential retrograde from the forward supply points. In order to augment and reduce the stress produced by the overuse of military assets, transportation managers assist in the development of contracts, within the host nation's commercial sector, in order to distribute the workload between commercial and military assets.
Key to the process in writing and executing these contracts is to determine what the government's requirements are if it is not a permissive environment. This too was a major source of frustration throughout the planning and executing phases. 19 The missions can be Europe where rail, barge, and road assets were used to move the Division from five locations in Germany to the sea port of embarkation at the port of Antwerp, Belgium.
Inter-zonal transport operations are line haul movements operated over long distances to serve the entire theater as shown in Figure 1 . Both full and empty assets are moved across the theater to ensure that materiel moves to its destination and that the transportation assets are returned to the C2 system for reuse. These operations are commanded and controlled by a centralized headquarters provided by the transportation command, or Corps support command, depending on the size of the area of responsibility. These headquarters may operate a portion of the route or the entire route, depending on the size of the geographical area and the availability of transportation units. 23 Inter-zonal transport operations were used in Operation Iraq While actively engaged in the deployment and employment process, the Division's logistics leadership found it extremely difficult to provide the commanding general a true picture and timeline of his Division's movement. Neither military nor commercial land transportation assets were visible. The movement table changed by the hour, in some cases, as new information on transportation assets was made available. These frequent changes were caused by an inability to see beyond the most current hours of operation. It became evident that there was little effective coordination between the Theater transportation command and the COSCOM, at least not on a continual basis.
As mentioned, daily coordination meetings were held in order to determine requirements and to match those requirements with assets expected to be available for the next several days.
Members that attended the meetings included representatives from Army and Marine units preparing to employ forces into Iraq. Also participating in the coordination meetings were members of the transportation battalions that controlled the assets of the truck battalions. They were responsible for providing the number of trucks, by type, that would be available on succeeding days. These meetings allowed all units with transformation requirements to meet with those units that managed the assets to satisfy their requirements. Assets were assigned and compromises were negotiated in order to expedite the northward movement of all assets.
As the days continued to pass, the backlog of equipment requiring movement north continued to grow, compounding the backlog already established. As the backlog grew for the 1 st Infantry Division, the Marines became the priority of movement to the north and west. This began to accentuate the already growing problem of employment for the Division.
Senior logisticians of the theater met daily to discuss the situation, as they understood it.
This leadership included the deputy CFLCC commander, TSC commander, the transportation command commander, and assistant division commanders for support (ADC-S) for 1 st Infantry, 1 st Calvary, 4 th Infantry Divisions and the MEU/MEF. These meetings produced the final assets' allocation decisions and after adjournment, no changes or adjustments were made for the next 24-48 hours unless the assets promised were for some reason not forthcoming. As the available assets were placed against requirements, a significant shortfall continued to arise.
These meetings were held late in the day and often continued till late at night. Planning movements the night before execution does not provide the truck units enough time to react. These executive sessions were not able to solve the transportation management problem in spite of how hard they tried to effect change within a 24-hour lock in period. The TSC staff and other deploying and redeploying unit planners worked to develop the allocation plan in the allocation board to correct the system, only to have that plan re-worked by the senior officers later that night based on new information the TSC commander received directly from the supported units' senior leadership on show/no-show rates for the day. Despite the work of the daily coordination meeting and executive session, the number of transportation assets that arrived never matched the projected assets submitted by the transportation command for planning, thereby resulting in a sub-optimal transportation plan and poor execution.
There is no doctrine written specifically for the use and management of commercial transportation assets. Since there is no written doctrine, transportation managers must rely on their own experience and understanding of current transportation management doctrine on how to incorporate commercial transportation assets into standard military transportation operations.
All truck assets, whether commercial or military, must be managed in a similar way under the same command and control architecture. 25 As the host nation transportation infrastructure is developed, the contracting for commercial assets must be designed with standard transportation doctrine in mind.
Management of these commercial assets must be accomplished as if these assets were military units, though they may not have the same attributes or capabilities. Though constructing the contract and managing these commercial assets as military units may be extremely difficult, particularly during a conflict, there must be clearly defined parameters that the contractor must be expected to follow or face legal ramifications. Though this level of detailed data is important for movement, its completion should be secondary to the allocation of the transportation assets. 27 The Division Transportation Officer was required to submit several dozen transportation movement requests, but these requests were only partially filled. New requests needed to be submitted for the equipment that could not be loaded each day. The requesting unit never knew for sure when or if vehicles would show up, which meant that the individual filling out the movement request did not know exactly what would be loaded on the trucks; he could not list the equipment on the new transportation movement request since he had no idea until the end of the day what would really be loaded.
This was a major point of friction. The number of transportation assets must be agreed upon in advance and then be delivered each day. This will ensure the accuracy of the movement requests. The other course of action is to send available transportation assets, allow the unit to load them, and afterwards submit the accurate movement request. MCBs must be allowed to expand to meet the required coverage through contracts with LOGCAP or by employing the Movement Control Specialists assigned to subordinate level commands to maintain a seamless C2 structure over the entire transportation structure.
RECOMMENDATION(S)
Transportation management is a difficult mission, particularly in combat support Transportation management doctrine must change to incorporate commercial assets in significantly more detail. Acknowledging the value of host nation support and commercial contracting in the new doctrine is not enough. The new doctrine must provide guidance and direction to the emerging movement control managers of the future and provide key elements of contractual requirements that the contractor must fulfill. The means to control contracts, and thus the contractor, is critical to ensure that the transportation assets so crucial in supporting the war fighter are available and will perform missions as directed. If too much flexibility or too many loopholes are provided in the contract, then the contractor can impose his own limitations or be selective in the support provided. As a result, the contractor will not provide either the desired support, which was the purpose of the contract, or the support provided to the customer will be inadequate and there will be no recourse with the contractor. WORD COUNT=6510
